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nate the claims of a faultless and innocent parent in a di-
vorce suit, as was decided in Oliver v. Oliver.1
Maryland courts tend to follow the view suggested by
Judge Hammond's dissent in Ex Parte Frantum:
"Precedents and theories should never control the
decision of a custody or adoption case since the answer
to the question of what is for the best interests and
welfare of the child necessarily depends on judgment
applied to a set of facts and circumstances which, like
the proverbial will, has no twin brother."52
Perhaps optimum results would obtain by combining
the observations of trained social workers with the au-
thority of the judiciary, either (1) in a single individual,
the Friend of the Court, used in Michigan, who maintains
constant vigilance over innumerable details affecting the
child's best interests;53 or (2) by establishing, either
through judicial decision or statute, a power in the courts
whereby, as parens patriae, they, on their own initiative,
may order investigations by experienced welfare workers
and probation officers in custody cases.54
BENJAMIN N. Do~mAN
Retroactive Sales And Use Taxes Unconstitutional
Comptroller v. Glenn L. Martin Co.'
The plaintiff appellee, Martin, is the manufacturer of
aircraft, aircraft parts, and missiles for use by the military.
During the Korean War the Federal government engaged
Martin to produce weapons to carry out its military opera-
tions. Because of its limited capital, Martin was unable to
produce the aircraft in the desired quantities, so the con-
tracts for production, two with the Navy and one with the
Air Force, contained stipulations by which the govern-
51217 Md. 222, 140 A. 2d 908 (1958).
214 Md. 100, 133 A. 2d 408 (1957), di8. op. 107; cf. Edwards v. Engledorf,
192 S.W. 2d 31, 34 (Mo. 1946), where the court, taking custody from a
grandmother with whom the child has spent most of his life, ". . . regrets to
have to decide cases of this character. * * * In this situation sentiment
makes a strong appeal, but courts cannot be governed by sentiment.
Sympathy must give way to the cold facts and the law." See n. 33, supra.
"See Bronson, Custody on Appeal, 10 Law and Contemp. Prob. 737 (1944).
"See 35 A.L.R. 2d 629, 632, naming Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, Mexico, Texas, and the District of Columbia as recognizing
such procedures; see also Boone v. Boone, 150 F. 2d 153 (D.C. App. 1945).
1216 Md. 235, 140 A. 2d 288 (1958) ; cert. den.
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ment would furnish Martin with the equipment it had on
hand. Those tools and equipment which could not be fur-
nished by the government were to be acquired by Martin
through its own expenditures. Under these so-called facili-
ties contracts, all equipment was immediately, upon de-
livery to Martin, to become the property of the govern-
ment. The government was to reimburse Martin, and the
appellee was to use all such tools and equipment without
cost to produce the weapons. The Air Force contract pro-
vided for government payment of all legally assessed taxes
with respect to the purchases made by Martin pursuant
to the contract. The Navy contracts had a similar pro-
vision under which the Federal government would reim-
burse Martin for all state and local taxes which Martin
paid under protest.
During the period of purchases, which was from March
1, 1951 to April 30, 1954, Martin paid the sales or use tax on
all tangible property acquired by it. Before Martin brought
this action for a refund of the taxes paid,2 the Court of
Appeals decided Comptroller v. Aerial Products3 and Bal-
timore Foundry v. Comptroller,4 in which purchases simi-
2 The Maryland Use Tax is complementary to the Sales Tax and only
applies to those transactions upon which no sales tax has been paid. In
this case both taxes are involved but they were dealt with on the basis that
the exclusions applicable to the Sales Tax were also applicable to the pay-
ment of use taxes. The Sales Tax sections under which Martin paid the
taxes were:
MD. CODE (1951) Art. 81, §320(d) (now 7 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 81,
§324(d)], which defines "sale" as including "any transaction whereby
title or possession, or both, of tangible personal property is . . . trans-
ferred . . . for consideration to any purchaser by any vendor."
MD. CODE (1951) Art. 81, Sec. 320(f) [now 7 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 81,
§324(f)], defines a "retail sale" or a "sale at retail" as Including ". . . the
sale in any quantity or quantities of any tangible property . . ." and states:
"Said term shall mean all sales of tangible personal property to any
person for any purpose other than those in which the purpose of the
purchaser is to resell the property so transferred in the form in which
the same is, or is to be received by him .......
8210 Md. 627, 124 A. 2d 805 (1956). There the appellee, a manufacturer
of flares and signal products, acquired personal property for use in the
manufacture of supplies under an Army contract. The court upheld the
inapplicability of the Maryland sales tax to the purchases. The court said
that under the terms of the facilities contract title vested in the govern-
ment upon purchase by the appellee. The court further pointed out that the
taxpayer was a mere licensee and said, 644: "The purpose of the Maryland
Act in taxing retail sales Is -to impose the tax on the final purchaser or
ultimate consumer and to avoid a pyramiding of the tax."
'211 Md. 316, 127 A. 2d 368 (1956). In this case a taxpayer produced
steel castings which were fashioned from a pattern which it purchased.
When the taxpayer sold the castings the firm also sold the patterns to the
purchaser at a profit. The court held the sales tax did not apply since the
sole purpose of a purchaser need not be to resell to be exempt from the tax
and the collateral purpose of using the patterns in the manufacture of the
castings was not a basis for sustaining the sales tax on the purchases of
patterns.
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lar to those made by Martin were excluded from the pay-
ment of sales taxes under the statute.' In direct response to
these decisions, the Maryland legislature in 1957 amended
the sales tax statute6 so that it would include purchases
made under facilities contracts. The amendment was made
retroactive to July 1, 1947, the effective date of the sales
tax of that year.
The trial court found the tax imposed under the
amended statute to be unconstitutional as a denial of due
process because of its retroactive effect. On appeal the
Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's ruling. The
Court of Appeals was faced with two problems: (1)
Whether the purchases by Martin were subject to a sales
tax under the original statute and (2) if not, whether the
retroactive amendment was a denial of due process under
the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution'
or a violation of Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights.8 Relying on Comptroller v. Aerial Products" and
Baltimore Foundry v. Comptroller,° the court held that
purchases Martin made pursuant to the contracts were not
subject to a tax under the original statute. The court, in
an opinion by Chief Judge Brune, pointed out that the
equipment purchased would not be subject to the tax
before the amendment, even though Martin used the tools
acquired to produce the aircraft and did not purchase the
equipment solely for purposes of resale to the government.
In dealing with the retroactive effect of the 1957 statute,
the court was faced with a more difficult problem. The
court classified various retroactive taxes, both state and
federal, which had been sustained, and decided, since the
present tax did not fall within the scope of any of these,
that it was invalid under the due process clause of the 14th
6MD. CODE (1951) Art. 81, §320(f) [now 7 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 81,
§324(f)].
0Mn. LAWS 1957, Ch. 3 [now Art. 81, §324(f)], ibid. The amended sales
tax statute defined sale at retail as including:
"Sales of tangible personal property . . . to any person who will
use the same as facilities, tools, tooling, machinery or equipment (in-
cluding, but not limited to dies, molds and patternm) even though such
person intends to transfer and/or does transfer title to such property
or service either before or after such person uses the facilities, tools,
tooling, machinery or equipment."
U. S. Const. Amend. XIV, §1.9 MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, Art. 23:
"That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his
freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any
manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by
the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land."
D210 Md. 627, 124 A. 2d 805 (1956).
0211 Md. 316, 127 A. 2d 368 (1956).
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Amendment of the Federal Constitution" and Article 23
of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.12 The court, in its
classification, pointed to cases in which retroactive taxes
were sustained because they taxed the income received
from transactions which had occurred prior to the enact-
ment of the tax but which were, nevertheless, in the recent
past. The court did not include the present tax in this
"recent transactions" area," since the extent of retroac-
tivity (three to six years) was held to be too great in length
of time to be termed recent. Nor would the court uphold
the present tax on the ground that it came within the ratifi-
cation doctrine, 4 (where a defect in the authority of the
state to collect the tax was subsequently validated by
legislative action) since the court held the questioned retro-
active tax provisions to be new enactments rather than an
attempt at legislative ratification. Since the Court of Ap-
peals decided the validity of the tax solely on the basis
of whether its retroactive effect was a denial of due process,
the court found it unnecessary to decide the issue of inter-
governmental immunity from taxation.
In deciding the validity of a retroactive tax two prob-
lems seem to be given weight in determining whether such
a tax will be sustained. First, the type of tax involved
may be important in determining whether the retroac-
tivity will or will not be upheld, and secondly, the degree
of retroactivity may be important.
As to type of tax, in the area of gift and estate taxes,
the courts have generally taken the position that to impose
a retroactive tax on a transfer is so arbitrary and unrea-
sonable as to be a denial of due process. In Nichols v.
Coolidge," the decedent transferred property under an
irrevocable trust in 1907. Under the terms of the trust, the
settlors retained a life estate. However, in 1917, the settlors
assigned their entire interest in the property to their chil-
dren, the remaindermen under the trust. Upon the deced-
ent's death in 1921, the government imposed an estate tax
on the 1907 transaction under the Revenue Act of 1918. The
Supreme Court struck down the tax as a violation of due
U Supra, n. 7.
1Supra, n. 8.
I Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U. S. 1 (1916) ; Lynch v. Hornby,
247 U. S. 339 (1918) ; Cooper v. United States, 280 U. S. 409 (1930) ; Welch
v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 118 A.L.R. 1142 (1938).
2, United States v. Heinszen & Co., 206 U. S. 370 (1907) ; Chuoco Tiaco v.
Forbes, 228 U. S. 549 (1913).
274 U. S. 531 (1927). Also see Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142 (1927);
Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U. S. 440 (1928); Coolidge v. Long, 282 U. S.
582 (1931).
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process. Since the taxpayer had no knowledge of the tax
at the time of the transfer, he did not have the opportunity
to refrain from making the transfer as he might have done
had he been able to anticipate the tax. That this rule is
not absolute however, is illustrated in Milliken v. United
States.6 There the court found no problem in sustaining
the validity of the Revenue Act of 1920, which taxed gifts
made in contemplation of death. Although the gift was
made in 1916, the court held the 1920 tax applicable, since
the donor knew the gift was subject to the tax when he
made it and the only change was an increase in the rate of
the tax. Retroactive taxes on income are less susceptible
to this argument than are retroactive gift and estate taxes.
There the courts take a somewhat different view because
the tax is not imposed on a single voluntary act of the tax-
payer, but on the results of activity over a more extended
period of time. The courts have concluded that a taxpayer
would probably still continue to earn or receive income by
the same method, even if he could have anticipated a retro-
active tax.17 This seems to be one reason the courts have
generally sustained the retroactive application of income
tax statutes.
Is the sales tax involved in this case closer to the income
tax or the gift tax, with respect to the nature and impact
of the tax? A businessman will usually find it easy to pass
on a sales or use tax to his customers through a corre-
sponding increase in the price charged.'" When a sales
tax is retroactively imposed, the businessman will be hurt
10283 U. S. 15 (1931).
17Welch v. Henry, 305 U. S. 134, 118 A. L. R. 1142 (1938). In this case,
the state of Wisconsin imposed an income tax on corporate dividends
which had previously been allowed to be deducted from gross income. The
statute was retroactively applied to such income received in 1933. The chief
objection to the statute was that the taxpayer had to bear a burden of
which he had no warning and could not foresee. The Supreme Court sus-
tained the validity of the tax saying, 148: "We can not assume that stock-
holders would refuse to receive corporate dividends even if they knew that
their receipt would later be subjected to a new tax or to the increase of
an old one." Also see Neuhoff, Retrospective Taz Laws, 21 St. L. Law
Rev. 1 (1935).
18 The Martin Company did not have this problem since it provided in its
contracts with the Federal Government that the Federal would reimburse
It for any sales or use taxes legally imposed. Thus, the actual effect of
the decision is that the Federal Government will get the benefit of the
refund of taxes in issue. In consequence, the money in question will go
to the Federal Government rather than to the State of Maryland. It was,
of course, only proper that the Court of Appeals did not take this factor
into consideration. In deciding whether the retroactive sales and use taxes
Imposed by the 1957 amendment were unconstitutional, the impact of such
taxes on the average taxpayer should be the criterion, not the peculiar
situation of the Martin Company in this case.
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in that he will have lost the opportunity to shift the burden
of the tax to his customers. With an income tax, however,
it is not as easy to shift its impact to others, and, for this
reason, a retroactive imposition of an income tax seems less
harsh than a retroactive imposition of sales and use taxes.
The practical distinction between the impact of an income
tax and the impact of sales and use taxes adds support to
the result reached by the Court of Appeals in applying the
more rigorous approach of the Supreme Court cases in the
gift and estate tax area as compared to the approach in the
income tax area.
As to the degree of retroactivity to which a tax may be
constitutionally imposed,' the courts have been quick to
point out that a tax is not unconstitutional merely because
it has a retroactive effect;20 yet, it is obvious that the legis-
lative power to tax retroactively should not be unlimited.
If retroactivity were unlimited, a resulting tax could be so
oppressive as to bankrupt the taxpayer upon whom the levy
was made.2' Although the courts have not laid down a
specific point in time beyond which the legislature may
not pass, they have pointed out that taxing statutes which
are retroactive for short periods are not objectionable.2
However, as the degree of retroactivity increases, the courts
have a more difficult time in sustaining such a tax. For
example, even in the instant case, a taxpayer's financial
position may have altered so radically so. as to make pay-
ment a burden.23 Extreme retroactive periods are held un-
"In considering the validity of a retroactive tax, the degree of retro-
activity generally plays a secondary role, since the type of tax may itself
determine whether or not it will be upheld. This can best be illustrated
by the gift cases where even a short retroactive period is not upheld. See
Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U. S. 440 (1928).
0 Wagner v. Baltimore, 239 U. S. 207 (1915) ; Welch v. Henry, 305 U. S.
134, 118 A.L.R. 1142 (1938) ; Match Co. v. State Tax Comm., 175 Md. 234,
200 A. 365 (1938).
"See Commonwealth v. Budd, 379 Pa. 159, 108 A. 2d 563, 568 (1954),
where the court said:
"It is obvious, however, that there must be some limitation on the
right of a legislative body to pass laws imposing taxes retroactively,
for otherwise a legislature could constitutionally impose new or in-
creased taxes retroactively for a period of 25 or 50 years which would
be so onerous or confiscatory and unjust as to bankrupt the individuals
or corporations thus taxed."
22Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 118 A.L.R. 1142 (1938) ; Brushaber v.
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
In Wilgard Realty Co v. Commissioner of Internal Rev., 127 F. 2d 514
(2nd Cir. 1942), the court sustained an income tax amendment that had
been made retroactive seven years. In that case, however, the retroactive
application of the amendment did not defeat the taxpayer's expectations
at the time of the original transaction. Indeed, it merely required the tax-
payer to continue to treat the transaction, tax-wise in the same way he had
originally treated it. Had the retroactive amendment been ineffective, the
taxpayer would have received an unjustified tax advantage.
1959]
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constitutional. This is brought out by the result reached
in People v. Graves,24 where the Court of Appeals of New
York found a sixteen year retroactive tax on income re-
ceived from foreign realty to be a denial of due process.
ERNEST J. WEIss, JR.
Possession And Recording Under Conditional
Sales Contracts
Mohr v. Sands1
Plaintiff, Mrs. A, a resident of Baltimore City, entered
into an agreement to purchase a new 1955 Nash automobile
from B Corporation, located in Baltimore County, on June
6, 1955, under a conditional sales contract. The contract
was assigned for value to plaintiff, C Credit Corporation,
and recorded among the Chattel Records of Baltimore City
on June 9, 1955. C Credit Corporation was unaware that
Mrs. A was not buying the car for herself, but had per-
mitted her ex-husband to use her credit in the purchase
of the automobile, which was to be used by him as a demon-
strator during his employment as a salesman for B Cor-
poration. He was to make the down payment and monthly
installments, upon completion of which Mrs. A was to
transfer title to him, and Mrs. A testified that she never
contemplated taking possession of the car, and knew it was
to be used as a demonstrator. The Department of Motor
Vehicles issued a certificate of title for the car in Mrs. A's
name on July 27, 1955.
On July 19th, Mr. D, one of the defendants, purchased
the same automobile, which was still on display in B's
showroom, from a salesman other than Mr. A. Mr. D's
conditional sales contract was assigned for value to de-
fendant E Credit Corporation and duly recorded. On August
10th the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, acting upon a
forged application for a duplicate title and a forged assign-
ment from Mrs. A to D, and an application for a new title,
purportedly signed by D, but also stated to be forged, issued
a new title to D, showing a lien in favor of E Credit Cor-
poration.
21280 N. Y. 405, 21 N. E. 2d 371 (1939).
1213 Md. 206, 131 A. 2d 732 (1957).
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